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βε1Lakatos Reviewε0
.sp 2
Imre Lakaton, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research
Programs," in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds., ε2Criticism and the
Growth of Knowledgeε0 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1970),
pp. 91-196.

.ne 4
ε11. Science: reason or religion?ε0

Popper grasped the full implications of the collapse of the
best-corroborated scientific theory of all time: Newtonian mechanics and the
Newtownian theory of gravitation.  Scepticism concerning our capabilities of
discovery was beaten into submission by the glory of Newtonian physics, but
Einstein's results again turned the tables and by now very few philosophers
of science think that scientific knowledge is, or even can be, proven
knowledge.  But with this the whole classical structure of intellectual
values has fallen into ruins and must be replaced.  One cannot simply water
down the ideal of proven truth (as some logical empiricists do) to the ideal
of `probable truth,' or (as some sociologists of knowledge do) to truth by
(changing) consensus.  Popper holds that virtue lies not in caution in
avoiding errors, but in ruthlessness in eliminating them.  He advocates
boldness in conjectures and austerity in refutations.  For him, intellectual
honesty does not consist in attempting to entrench one's positions by
proving or `problifying' it, but rather in stating the precise conditions
under which you are prepared to give it up.  ε2Beliefε0 may be an
unavoidable biological weakness to be kept under the control of criticism,
but ε2committmentε0 is for Popper an outright crime.

.ne 2
Kuhn thinks otherwise.  He agrees with Popper in rejecting the idea that
science grows by the accumulation of eternal truths.  He too takes his main
inspiration from the overthrow of Newtonian physics.  He too takes
ε2scientific revolutionε0 as the main problem.  But while according to
Popper science is revolution in permanence, and criticism is the heart of
scientific enterprise, for Kuhn revolution is exceptional and, indeed,
extra-scientific, and criticism is, in normal times, anathema.  For Kuhn the
transition from criticism to committment marks the point where progress --
and normal science -- begins.  For him the idea that on refutation one can
demand the rejection of a theory is "naive" falsificationism.  Lakatos'
concern is that Kuhn, having recognized the failures both of
justificationism and naive falsificationism in providing accounts of the
growth of knowledge, wants to fall back on ε2irrationalismε0.

.ne 2
For Popper scientific change is rational or least rationally reconstructible
and falls in the realm of the ε2logic of discoveryε0.  For Kuhn,
scientific change is a mystical conversion not governable by rules of reason
and which falls completely in the realm of the ε2social psychology of
discovery.ε0 

.ne 2
"The clash between Popper and Kuhn . . . concerns central intellectual
values, and has implications not only for theoretical physics but also for
the underdeveloped social sciences, and even for moral and political
philosophy.  If even in science there is no other way of judging a theory
but by assessing the number, faith and vocal energy of its supporters, then
this must be more so in the social sciences: truth lies in power."

.ne 2
Lakatos will show that two positions are conflated in Popper's logic of
scientific discovery, only one of which (naive methodological
falsificationism) Kuhn understands.  He thinks Kuhn's position is correct
will even try to strengthen it, but the stronger Popperian position
(sophisticated methodological falsificationism) may escape Kuhn's critique
and constitute a way to understand scientific revolutions not as religious
conversions but rather as rational progress.

.ne 4
ε12. Fallibilism versus falsificationism.ε0

To see the conflicting these more easily, we must reconstruct the problem
situation as it was in the philosophy of science after the breakdown of
`justificationism.'  ε2According to `justificationists' scientific
knowledge consisted of proven propositions.ε0  They disagreed about the
nature of the axioms whose truth could be proven by extra-logical means.
ε2Classical intellectualistsε0 admitted very varied and powerful sorts of
extra-logical "proofs," by revelation, intellectual intuition, experience.
These, with the help of logic enabled them to "prove" every sort of
scientific proposition.  ε2Classical empiricistsε0 accepted as axioms only
a relatively small set of `factual propositions' which expressed the `hard
facts.' [see Knorr]  Their truth-value was established by experience and
consituted the ε2empirical basisε0 of science.  In order to prove theories
from nothing else but brute facts, they needed a logic more powerful than
the deductive logic of the classical intellectualists.  They needed an
ε2inductive logicε0.  All justificationists agreed that a singular
statement may ε2disproveε0 a universal theory, but few thought that a
finite conjunction of factual propositions might be sufficient to
ε2proveε0 inductively a universal theory.

.ne 2
For all of them, ε2scientific honesty demanded that on assert nothing that
is unprovenε0.  But both were defeated: intellectualists by Non-Euclidian
geometry and non-Newtoenian physics, and empiricists by the impossibility of
establishing an empirical basis (as Kantians pointed out, facts cannot prove
propositions) and of establishing an inductive logic (no logic can
infallibly increase content).  It turned out that ε2all theories are
equally unprovable.ε0  To avoid the conclusion that theoretical science is
thus a dishonest fraud, a group of Cambridge philosophers developed
ε2probabilismε0 (or ε2neo-justificationismε0) which held that although
all theories are equally unprovable they have different degrees of
probability relative to the available empirical evidence.  Scientific
honesty then requires less that had been thought: ε2it consists in
uttering only highly probable theories; or even in merely specifying, for
each scientific theory, the evidence, and the probability of the theory in
light of this evidence.ε0

.ne 2
This was a major retreat for justificationism, and it proved to be
insufficient.  Largely due to the efforts of Popper, it was shown that under
very general conditions all theories have zero probability, whatever the
evidence. ε2All theories are not only equally unprovable but also equally
improbable.ε0

.ne 2
Some argued, and some still argue, that the failure to find at least a
probabilistic solution to the problem of induction means that we must throw
over all that is considered knowledge by science and common sense.  It is
against this backdrop that falsificationism must be assessed.
Falsificationism was in a sense a new and considerable retreat for rational
thought, but since it retreated from utopian standards, it cleared away much
hypocrisy and muddled thought, and thus represented a real advance.

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.ne 4
ε12a. Dogmatic (or naturalistic) falsificationism.  The empirical basis.ε0

Dogmatic falsificationism admits the fallibility of all scientific theories,
but retains a sort of infallible empirical basis.  It is strictly empiricist
without being inductivist.  ε2Thus it is the weakest brand of
justificationism.ε0 The hallmark of dogmatic falsificationism is the
recognition that all theories are equally conjectural.  Science cannot
ε2proveε0 any theory, but it can ε2disproveε0.  For dogmatic
falsificationists ε2scientific honesty consists of specifying, in advance,
an experiment such that if the result contradicts the theory, the theory has
to be given up.  According to the logic of dogmatic falsificationism,
science grows by repeated overthrow of theories with the help of hard
facts.ε0

.ne 2
But dogmatic falsificationism is untenable.  It rests on two false
assumptions and a too narrow criterion of demarcation between the scientific
and the non-scientific.

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.ne 2
ε2First assumptionε0 -- there is a natural, ε2psychologicalε0 borderline
between theoretical or speculative propositions on the one hand and factual
or observational (or basic) propositions on the other (this is part of the
ε2naturalistic approachε0 to scientific method). [note: in other words,
dogmatic falsificationists do not comprehend the (hermeneutic) phenomenology
of perception]

.ne 2
ε2Second assumptionε0 -- if a proposition satisfies the psychological
criterion of being factual or observational (or basic) then it is true; one
may say it was proved from facts.  This is the ε2doctrine of observational
proof.ε0 [notice that this assumption is the other side of the same coin]

.ne 2
ε2Demarcation criterionε0 -- Only those theories are scientific which
forbid certain observational states of affairs and are therefore factually
disprovable. ε2Or, a theory is scientific if it has an empirical basisε0.

.ne 4
ε1The criterion and both assumptions are false.  Here's why.ε2

First assumptionε0 -- There are and can be no sensations unimpregnated by
expectations and therefore ε2there is no natural (i.e. psychological)
demarcation between observational and theoretical propositions.

.ne 2
Second assumptionε0 -- Our imaginations may play a greater role in the
formulation of theories than in the formulation of factual propositions, but
they are both fallible. [Peirce, Hegel, Kant] Thus ε2we cannot prove
theories and we cannot disprove them either.ε0 [Note that these two
critiques are really one].ε2

.ne 2
Demarcation criterionε0 -- Exactly the most admired scientific theories
simply fail to forbid any observational states of affairs.  Some scientific
theories only forbid an event occuring in some specified spatio-temporal
region ε2only on the condition that no other factorε0 (possibly hidden in
some dusty corner of the universe) ε2has any influence on it.ε0 Some
scientific theories are normally interpreted as containing a ε2ceteris
paribusε0 clause: in scuh cases it is always specified together with this
clause which may be refuted.  But such a refutation is inconsequential for
the specific theory under test, because by replacing the ε2ceteris
paribusε0 clause with a different one, the scientific theory can be saved
ε2no matterε0 what the tests say.
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.ne 2
In sum: classical justificationists only admitted proven theories;
neoclassical justificationists probable ones; dogmatic falsificationists
realized that in either case no theories are admissible.  They decided to
admit theories only if they are disprovable by a finite number of
observations.  But we have seen that ε2scientific theories are not only
equally unprovable, and equally improbable, but they are equally
undisprovable.ε0 But if ε2allε0 the propositions of science, theoretical and
factual, are fallible, then this means the total collapse of all forms of
dogmatic justificationism, including dogmatic falsificationism, as theories
of scientific rationality.

.ne 4
ε12b. Methodological falsificationism. The `empirical basis.'ε0

If this is true, then the sceptics are finally right: science is no more
than vain speculation and there is no such thing as progress in scientific
knowledge.  Can we still oppose scepticism?  Can we save scientific
criticism from fallibilism?  Is it possible to have a fallibilistic theory
of scientific progress?  In particular, if scientific criticism is fallible,
on what ground can we ever eliminate a theory?

.ne 2
A most intriguing answer is provided by ε2methodological
falsificationism.ε0  Methodological falsificationism is a brand of
conventionalism; therefore, in order to understand it we must first discuss
conventionalism in general.

.ne 2
There is an important demarcation between ε2passivistε0 and ε2activistε0
theories of knowledge.  Passivists hold that true knowledge is Nature's
imprint on a perfectly inert mind: mental ε2activityε0 can only result in
bias and distortion.  Activists hold that we cannot read the book of nature
without mental activity.  ε2Conservative activistsε0 hold that we are born
with our basic expectations; with them we turn the world into `our world'
but must then live forever in the prison of our world.  ε2Revolutionary
activistsε0 hold that conceptual frameworks can be developed and also
replaced by new and better ones; it is we who create our prisons and we can
also, critically, demolish them.

.ne 2
There are two schools of revolutionary activism, Duhem's simplicism and
Popper's methodological falsificationism.  Duhem accepts the
conventionalists' position that no physical theory ever crumbles under the
weights of refutations, but claims that the continual addition of ε2ceteris
paribusε0 clauses will force the theory to lose its original simplicity.
Once this simplicity is lost, he argues, the theory has to be replaced.
This reduces falsificationism to subjective taste or scientific fashion.
Popper set out to find a criterion that is at once both more objective and
more hard-hitting.  His methodological falsificationism is both
conventionalist and falsificationist, but he differs from conservative
conventionalists in holding that the statements decided by agreement are not
spatio-temporally universal but are spatio-temporally singular.  And he
differs from the dogmatic falsificationist in holding that the truth-value
of such statements cannot be proved by facts but, in some cases, may be
decided by agreement.

.ne 2
The Duhemian conservative conventionalist makes unfalsifiable by fiat some
spatio-temporally universal theories which are distinguished by their
explanatory power, simplicity, or beauty.  The Popperian methodological
falsificationist makes unfalsifiable by fiat some spatio-temporally singular
statements which are distinguished by the fact that there exists at the time
a `relevant technique' such that `anyone who has learned it' will be able to
decide that the statement is `acceptable.' [Note the ideal speech community
implicit in this].  Such a statement may be called an `observational' or
`basic' statement, but only in inverted commas.  The very selection of such
statements is a matter of decision, which is not based upon exlusively
psychological considerations.  This decision is then followed by a second
kind of decision concerning the separation of the set of ε2acceptedε0
`basic' statements from the rest.

.ne 2
These two decisions correspond to the two assumptions of dogmatic
falsificationism, but with important differences.  Above all, the
methodological falsificationist is not a justificationist.  He has no
illusions about `experimental proofs' and is fully aware of the fallibility
of his decisions and the risks he takes.

.ne 2
Realizing that the experimental techniques of science are fallible, he
nevertheless applies them, not as theories under test but as
ε2unproblematic background knowledgeε0 accepted temporarily while testing
another theory.  In this way the methodological falsificationist ε2uses our
most successful theories as extensions of our sensesε0 and widens the range
of theories which can be applied in testing far beyond the dogmatic
falsificationist's range of strictly observational theories.  The need for
decisions to demarcate the theory under test from unproblematic background
knowledge is a characteristic feature of this brand of methodological
falsificationism.  [page 106]

ε12c. Sophisticated versus naive falsificationism. Progressive and
degenerating problemshifts.ε0




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.ne 4
ε13. A methodology of scientific research programmes.ε0

We have discussed the problem of objective appraisal of scientific growth in
terms of progressive and degenerating problemshifts in series of scientific
theories.  The most important such series in the growth of science are
characterized by a certain ε2continuityε0 which connects their members.
this continuity evolves from a genuine research programme adumbrated at the
start.  The programme consists of methodological rules.  Some tell us what
paths of research to avoid (ε2negative heuristicsε0), and others tell us
what paths to pursue (ε2positive heuristicsε0).

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.ne 4
ε13a. Negative heuristic; the `hard core' of the programme.ε0

All scientific research programmes may be characterized by their ε2`hard
core.'ε0  The negative heuristic of the programme forbids us to direct the
ε2modus tollensε0 at this `hard core.'  Instead, we must use our ingenuity
to articulate or even invent `auxiliary hypotheses,' which form a
ε2protective beltε0 around this core, and we must redirect the ε2modus
tollensε0 to these.

.ne 2
We must require that each step of a research programme be consistently
content-increasing: that each step constitute a ε2consistently progressive
problemshiftε0 All we need in addition to this is that at least every now
and then the increase in content should be retrospectively corroborated: the
programme as a whole should also display an ε2intermittently progressive
empirical shiftε0.  We do not demand that each step produce immediately an
observed new fact.  Our term ε2`intermittently'ε0 gives sufficient
rational scope for dogmatic adherence to a programme in face of ε2prima
facieε0 `refutations.'

.ne 4
ε13b. Positive Heuristic; the construction of the `protective belt' and the
relative autonomy of theoretical science.ε0

The negative heuristic specifies the `hard core' of the programme which is
`irrefutable' by the methodological decision of its protagonists; the
positive heuristic consists of a partially articulated set of suggestions or
hints on how to change, develop the `refutable variants' of the research
programme, how to modify, sophisticate, the `refutable' protective belt. It
saves the scientist from drowning in an ocean of anomolies.  The positive
heuristic sets out a programme which lists a chain of ever more complicated
ε2modelsε0 simulating reality: the scientist's attention is riveted on
building his models following instructions which are laid down in the
positive part of his programme.  He ignores the ε2actualε0
counterexamples, the available `data.'

.ne 2
A model is a set of initial conditions (possibly with some of the
observational theories) which one knows is ε2boundε0 to be replaced during
the further development of the programme, and one even knows, more or less,
how.  This shows how irrelevant `refutations' of any specific variant are in
a research programme: their existence is fully expected, the positive
heuristic is there as a strategy both for predicting (producing) and
digesting them.  Indeed, if the positive heuristic is clearly spelled out,
the difficulties of the programme are mathematical rather than empirical.ε1

.ne 4
3b. The requirement of continuous growthε0

There are no such things as crucial experiments.  When one research
programme suffers defeat and is superceded by another, we may say -- ε2with
long hindsightε0 -- that a particular experiment was crucial if it turns
out to have provided a spectacular corroborating instance for the victorious
programme and a failure for the defeated one.  But scientists do not always
judge heuristic situations correctly.  A rash scientist may ε2claimε0 that
his experiment defeated a programme, and parts of the scientific community
may even, rashly, accept his claim.  But if a scientist of the defeated camp
puts forward a few years later a scientific explanation of the allegedly
`crucial experiment' within (or consistent with) the alleged defeated
programme, ε2the honorific title may be withdrawn and the `crucial
experiment' may turn from a defeat into a new victory for the programme.ε0

.ne 2
The idea of instant rationality can be seen to be utopian.  But this utopian
idea is a hallmark of most brands of epistemology.  Justificationists wanted
scientific theories to be proved even before they were published;
probabilists hoped a machine could flash up instantly the value (degree of
probability) of a theory, given the evidence; naive falsificationists hoped
that elimination at least was the instance result of the verdict of
ε2experimentε0.  I hope I have shown that ε2all these theories of instant
rationality -- and instant learning -- failε0.  I also hope I have shown
that the ε2tenacityε0 of some theories, the rationality of a certain amount
of dogmatism, can only be explained if we construe science as a battleground
of research programmes rather than of isolated theories.

.ne 2
ε2Mature science consists of research programmes in which not only novel
facts but, in an important sense, also novel auxiliary theories, are
anticipated; mature science -- unlike pedestrian trial-and-error -- has
`heuristic power.'ε0 In the positive heuristic there is, right at the start,
a general outline of how to build the protective belts: this heuristic power
generates ε2the autonomy of theoretical science.ε0

.ne 2
This ε2requirement of continuous growthε0 is my rational reconstruction of
the widely acknowledged requirement of `unity' or `beauty' of science.  It
highlights the weakness of ε2twoε0 -- apparently very different -- types
of theorizing.  First, it shows up the weakness of programmes which, like
Marxism or Freudism, are, no doubt, `unified,' which give a major sketch of
auxiliary theories they are going to use in absorbing anomalies, but which
unfailingly devise their actual auxiliary theories in the wake of facts
without, at the same time, anticipating others. [what about reification?]
Secondly, it hits patched-up, unimaginative series of pedestrian `empirical'
adjustments which are so frequent, for instance, in modern social
psychology.  Such adjustments may, with the help of so-called 'statistical
techniques,' make some `novel' predictions and may even conjure up some
irrelevant grain of truth in them.  But this theorizing has no unifying
idea, no heuristic power, no continuity.  They do not add up to a genuine
research programme and are, on the whole, worthless.

.ne 2
The `dogmatism' of `normal science' does not prevent growth as long as we
combine it with the Popperian recognition that there is good, progressive
normal science and that there is bad, degenerating normal science, and as
long as we retain the ε2determinationε0 to eliminate, under certain
objectively defined conditions, some research programmes. [might these
conditions differ for different sciences?]

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.ne 4
ε1. The Popperian versus the Kuhnian research programme.ε0

Kuhn is wrong in thinking that be discarding naive falsificationism he has
discarded thereby all brands of falsificationism.  The collapse of the
thesis that all scientific theories are provable, that the progress of
science is cumulative, made justificationists panic.  If `to discover is to
prove,' but nothing is provable, then there can be no discoveries, only
discovery-claims.

.ne 2
Kuhn overlooks Popper's sophisticated falsificationism and the research
programme he initiated.  Popper replaced the central problem of classical
rationality, the old problem of foundations, with the new problem of
ε2fallible-critical growthε0, and started to elaborate objective standards
of this growth.  In this paper, I have tried to develop his programme a step
further.  I think this small development is enough to escape Kuhn's
strictures.

.ne 2
Its main aspects were developed from Popper's ideas and, in particular, his
ban on `conventionalist,' that is, content-decreasing, strategems.  The main
difference between this version and Popper's original is that "in my
conception criticism does not -- and must not -- kill as fast as Popper
imagined.  Purely negative, destructive criticism, like `refutation' or
demonstration of an inconsistency does not eliminate a programme.  Criticism
of a programme is a long and frustrating process and one must treat budding
programmes leniently.  One may, of course, show up the degeneration of a
research programme, but it is only ε2constructive criticismε0 which, with
the help of rival research programmes, can achieve real successes; and
dramatic spectacular results become visible only with hindsight and rational
reconstruction [this of course means that Kuhn is right; the social
psychology of research prevents instant recognition]β